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Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
DNA Profiling: Transfer and Persistence 
R v Tsekiri [2017] EWCA Crim 40 
On 11th June 2016, Ms. Carr, the victim, unlocked her vehicle, which was parked on 
a street near Wimbledon Park Tube Station.  At this point, an unidentified man 
attempted to enter the car. A brief struggle ensued and the man escaped with Ms. 
Carr’s gold necklace. Swabs were taken from the exterior door handle of the vehicle 
and these revealed a mixed DNA profile. The profile belonging to the major 
contributor was consistent with that taken from the appellant (with a match 
probability of one in one billion). There was at least one other minor contributor. 
The reporting scientist could reach no determination as to when the major 
components of the mixed DNA profile had been deposited, nor their source. The 
deposit could have been due to that person touching the door handle, or due to 
indirect secondary transfer through an intermediary (though she considered this 
unlikely, given that the DNA in question was the major contributor to the profile). 
The appellant submitted that there was no case to answer given the dearth of 
evidence. 
Held, dismissing the appeal, “…there is no evidential or legal principle which 
prevents a case solely dependent on the presence of the defendant’s DNA profile on 
an article left at the scene of a crime being considered by a jury.” (per Lord Thomas 
at [21]). Whether the evidence is sufficient will depend on the facts of the case. 
However, the court provided a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors to be taken 
into account:  
 Can the presence of the DNA evidence be otherwise accounted for? 
 Was the article apparently associated with the offence itself? 
 How readily moveable was the article in question?  
 Is there evidence of some geographical association between the offence and 
the offender? 
 In the case of a mixed profile, is the DNA profile which matches the 
defendant, the major contributor?  
 Is it more or less likely that the DNA profile attributable to the defendant was 
deposited by primary, or secondary, transfer? (at [15] – [21]).  
Commentary 
In his 2014 Kalisher lecture to the Criminal Bar Association (Expert Evidence: The 
future of forensic science in criminal trials, 14th October 2014), the Lord Chief Justice, 
the Rt. Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, expressed concerns regarding the 
potential of new, or complex, scientific developments to tarnish the status of 
forensic DNA profiling. Lord Thomas identified the 'challenge for all…advocates and 
judges: to manage the presentation and testing of forensic evidence in such a way as 
to avoid fatally undermining confidence.’ (at [14]). The judiciary’s concern to 
maintain public confidence in this forensic keystone is well founded, given the 
unparalleled discriminatory power of DNA profiling techniques, and their unique 
ability to link the bio-identities of suspect populations to an ineradicable bodily 
substrate.  
Such is the importance of forensic DNA to the criminal justice system that the Home 
Office have gone to great lengths in their attempts to ensure that the reputation of 
DNA profiling - as the ‘gold standard’ of forensic identification tools - remains secure 
(Home Office (2008) A Review of the Science of Low Template DNA Analysis. London: 
The Stationery Office). Nonetheless, concerns over the integrity of DNA profiling 
techniques remain, and the endurance of these concerns may go some way to 
explaining the decision in R v Tsekiri, in which the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales addressed the problematic issue of DNA ‘transfer and persistence’. As will be 
demonstrated below, the sensitivity of cutting-edge forensic techniques now allows 
for the detection of minute traces of DNA, with potentially groundbreaking results 
(see, for example, HMA v Sinclair, HCJAC 131 (2014)). However, in those cases where 
the DNA sample cannot be conclusively linked to an activity, then the probative 
value of DNA may be severely compromised (see, for example, HMA v Tobin 2008 
GWD 40-607 ; Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] HCA 28). Cases testing the science of 
DNA profiling are extremely rare, and have generally been confined to the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales (R v Reed, Reed and Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 ; 
R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439; R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2). Whilst the court’s 
decision may help to maintain confidence in the probative value of forensic DNA 
profiling techniques, it may be argued that the judiciary have purchased security at 
the price of accuracy. The Court of Appeal previously emphasised the need to place 
DNA evidence in context: 
‘…if the DNA evidence stood alone, you could not convict on it on any count. 
But it does not stand alone and you will consider its value very carefully and 
use it as part of the evidence when you consider each count individually in the 
case as a whole.’ (R v Reed, Reed and Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698). 
However, this latest development opens the door for conviction on a sole piece of 
DNA evidence, provided the match probability is of a sufficient strength. Further, the 
inclusion of a list of factors to be taken into account, in those cases involving mixed 
profiles, would appear to be predicated on a misunderstanding of the current 
limitations of DNA profiling techniques. 
Indeed, the case highlights a growing problem for DNA profiling experts, whose 
technologies are now so sensitive that they routinely report ‘mixed’ samples, 
including deposits made indirectly through intermediate contacts, and low-template 
DNA shed naturally by individuals, and spread through contact and dispersal. In 
many cases, scientists can de-convolute mixed samples using their expertise, often 
with the aid of complex computer algorithms. The de-convoluted results may reveal 
a major contributor, and one - or more - minor contributors, all of whose profiles 
may be complete, or partial.  
However, the evaluative problems are not limited to attribution. Whilst individual 
profiles may be ‘matched’ to individuals on the DNA database - with probabilities in 
the order of one in one billion - the resulting evidence may be effectively neutralised 
by the issue of the transfer and persistence of DNA deposits across multiple surfaces. 
The interposition of such issues shifts the focus of analysis, such that the courts 
should no longer address themselves to the question of ‘to whom does this DNA 
sample belong?’ The salient question becomes, ‘how did this DNA sample come to 
get here?’ (Taroni F., Biedermann A., Vuille J., Morling N. (2013). Whose DNA is this? 
How relevant a question? (a note for forensic scientists). Forensic Sci. Int. Genet. 7, 
467–470).  
Given that different individuals shed epithelial ‘touch’ DNA at different rates; that 
different surfaces retain DNA at different rates; and that DNA may be deposited by 
secondary, or even tertiary, intermediaries (not to mention the presence of 
environmental factors); the task of answering activity propositions with any degree 
of certainty may prove difficult, if not impossible. Despite some rigorous attempts to 
establish a coherent database in respect of DNA transfer and persistence, research 
remains sporadic, and the results lack meaningful generalisability. See, for example: 
C. Davies, et al., Assessing primary, secondary and tertiary DNA transfer using the 
Promega ESI-17 Fast PCR chemistry, Forensic Sci. Int. Gene. Suppl. (2015). 
The problem is encapsulated in this excerpt from a research interview with a lead 
DNA profiling scientist. She considers a hypothetical situation based on the analysis 
of a profile recovered from a pair of gloves left at the scene of a robbery. The 
suspect claims that the gloves are his, but that they were borrowed by another 
individual: 
‘So now, the question is, “how did the DNA get there?” And now all of the 
source attribution evidence is completely irrelevant. And, [for any suggested 
explanation], the reason that DNA matching him is on the gloves is because he 
wore them, but I can’t tell you when he wore them, when was the last time he 
wore them, when his DNA was deposited, and in some cases, if it’s very weak, I 
can’t even tell you whether he deposited his DNA or if it went there through 
another individual or surface. It varies from individual to individual as well as 
condition to condition, surface to surface. The suspect could have been 
wearing them every day and he’s still only a minority contributor…You cant 
‘weight’ transfer and persistence.’ (Interview with DNA lead scientist (Tier 2 
forensic science provider), Oxford, 2015.) 
The above concerns are supported by laboratory studies, which demonstrate that 
DNA, deposited on an object as a result of secondary transfer, is frequently 
identified as either the only contribution, or the major contribution, to a mixed 
profile, despite the contributing individual never coming into direct contact with the 
object (see, for example, Cale CM, Bush GL, Earll ME & Latham KE (2016) Could 
Secondary DNA Transfer Falsely Place Someone at the Scene of a Crime? Journal of 
Forensic Science, January 2016;61(1): pp.196-203). Such studies illustrate the risks of 
assuming that DNA, recovered from an object, results from a direct contact. They 
also cast doubt on the Court of Appeal’s approach to such issues, given that the 
latter are effectively attempting to weight transfer and persistence. Indeed, further 
questions are raised as to whether it was possible for the court in Tsekiri to arrive at 
strong assertions, such that ‘there can be no doubt that the offender did touch the 
article in question.’ (at [16]). Further, studies would appear to confound the bare 
proposition that ‘secondary transfer was an unlikely explanation for the presence of 
the appellant's DNA on the door handle.’ (at [19]). Nor does the connection between 
the suspect, and a particular geographical location (at [18]) necessarily aid 
determination, since such a connection may be equally supportive of secondary 
transfer scenarios. 
The failure of the Courts to take this opportunity to address the pressing problem of 
DNA transfer and persistence is perhaps understandable, given that the evidence in 
the above case was not subject to rigorous cross-examination. However, both 
practitioners, and the courts, should be aware of the issues involved, alive to the 
importance of context, and wary of attempts to collapse the question of ‘how’ into 
the less scientifically problematic question of ‘who?’ Whilst there may be a number 
of economic, policy, and procedural reasons, for such an approach - centring on the 
perceived necessity to maintain the unblemished status of forensic DNA - attempts 
to evade the pressing question of transfer and persistence may provide only 
temporary security. 
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